

What “Comparative World Rhetorics” Has to Offer Intercultural Communication Studies

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Abstract: Due to their common focus on means and modes of communication, the fields of rhetoric and communication studies overlap in many ways. However, many scholars in these separate fields remain relatively unaware of connections and differences between them. One case of parallel, but separate, fields of study are the subfields of comparative rhetoric and intercultural communication studies. Both of these disciplines study communicative practices within various cultures and peoples around the world. This essay describes and explores two Hindu/Indian approaches to logic, rhetoric, and performance, Nyaya and Sadharanikaran, in order to illustrate and discuss the inter-relationship between comparative rhetoric and intercultural communication.

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1. Introduction

Due to their common focus on means and modes of communication, the fields of rhetoric and communication studies overlap in many ways. However, many scholars in these separate fields remain relatively unaware of connections and differences between them. One case of parallel, but separate, fields of study are the subfields of comparative rhetoric and intercultural communication studies. Both of these disciplines look at communication practices within various cultures and peoples around the world.

In order to understand their relationship, we need some working definitions of the two fields of study. As Bennett (2013) notes, “‘communication’ is the mutual creation of meaning and ‘culture’ is the coordination of meaning and action in a group, it follows that ‘intercultural communication’ is the mutual creation of meaning across cultures.” Intercultural communication then is “the mechanism whereby people of different groups perceive and try to make sense of one another.”

The term “comparative” in comparative rhetoric assumes a frame of comparison, and in this case, some knowledge of Greco-Roman, Euro-American Rhetoric. However, the concern that has defined *comparative* rhetoric from the start is how we can study Non-Western or Non-Greek rhetorics without imposing our own terms and perspectives on them. For scholars like Lu Ming Mao (2003) and others, comparative rhetoric begins with knowledge of Greek rhetoric, but makes every effort to avoid branding similar practices as versions or distortions of Greek rhetoric and seeks to understand “Non-Western rhetorics” in their own terms and context. In brief, comparative rhetoric to understand various rhetorics from around the globe, historical and current, and to add their terms, concepts and perspectives to the study of rhetoric.

As Bennett (2013) notes, “intercultural communication incorporates particular strategies that encourage us to attribute equal humanity and complexity to people who are not part of our own

group.” Comparative rhetoric shares these goals. It is well worth exploring their connections and implications.

2. Review of Literature

Mao (2003) notes that “To study non-Western rhetorical traditions, one surely must start somewhere ... we may not have any choice than to articulate other rhetorical traditions first by seeking out frames and terms found in our own tradition” (p. 417). He adds that our goal is not just to frame other traditions in traditional Greco-Roman terminologies: “our larger goal is to study these traditions on their own terms ... so that attention can be directed toward materials and conditions that are native to these traditions and so that appropriate frames and language can be developed to deal with differences as well as similarities between different traditions (pp. 417- 418).

As we apply these principles, “each process raises the level of understanding and enriches the modes of reflection” (p. 418). Through this process of what Mao calls “recontextualization,” fresh perspectives invigorate and change the field of rhetorical studies, the field of rhetorical studies enriches our understanding of rhetoric beyond Greco-Roman perspectives, and understanding of rhetoric is globalized beyond the borders of Euro-American rhetorical theories. Since cultures and peoples outside the Euro-American traditions often do not directly identify fields of study as rhetoric or communication, we need to look at disciplines or traditions within non-Western contexts that serve similar ends or employ similar methods. Though one is a school of logical philosophy and another a treatise on performance, this essay explores rhetorical aspects of these traditions in order illustrate and discuss the inter-relationship between comparative rhetoric and intercultural communication,

Undoubtedly, people all over the planet are communicating. But a second, related issue for comparative rhetoric is whether we can call what people outside Greco-Roman, Euro-American traditions are doing “rhetoric.” We can, if we interpret the word rhetoric very broadly. First, we need to recognize that rhetoric is no longer a Greek term. It is well-established as an English word, and thus is part of World Englishes everywhere. In addition, the word has been adopted into languages other than English worldwide (Lloyd, 2021, p. 5).

Though definitions of rhetoric would undoubtedly vary, one common element in all usages is that rhetoric is intentionally or conventionally shaping our message for specific contexts and audiences: Rhetoric is How we shape our What, our message (Lloyd, 2021, p. 4). The How refers to our choices in tone, vocabulary, language, dialect, idiolect, media, register, and conventions, motives, etc. These choices affect our message, so the How shapes the What and the What shapes the How. For instance, explaining Covid transmission, the What, would take very different forms when speaking to adults, high school students, and five-year-olds. Since “Rhetoric ... is the active shaping of the What and How in any communicative act,” obviously, Communication Studies and Comparative Rhetoric then seek similar ends, to understand human communication on a complex level.

Ganeri (2005, 2001, 2010, 2014, 2020) and Matilal (1998) have effectively brought Nyaya philosophy to the field of logical studies. Though Euro-American understandings of logic still predominate, Hindu/Indian logic is widely represented in essays, edited collections, and even books written for broader popular consumption, such as Ganeri’s (2014) *Identity as Reasoned Choice: The Reach and Resources of Public and Practical Reason*, and Amartya Sen’s (2006) *The Argumentative Indian* and (2014) *The Idea of Justice*. Lloyd (2007, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017,

2020) has established Hindu rhetoric's relation to rhetorical studies. At this point, however, the study of Hindu/Indian rhetoric¹ as part of rhetorical education and research is in its infancy.

Communication scholars Yadava (1987, 1998), Dissanayake (1988, 1993, 2006) and Adhikary (2009) (see also Lloyd 2015, p. 99) have already laid the groundwork for expanding our understanding of communication theory beyond Euro-American contexts by relating Indian/Hindu communication models – in particular, Sadharanikaran – to Western terminologies. However, their work has not yet resulted in the kind of “reflective encounters” Mao (2003) recommends for comparative rhetorical studies. Neither the general field of communication studies, nor intercultural communication studies has fully incorporated Indian/Hindu terminologies, concepts and/or models into their theoretical frameworks for analysis and interpretation.

3. Methods

Since rhetoric is often associated with persuasive speech and action, we can look for descriptions and methods of persuasive speech as starting points in defining rhetoric in Non-Western contexts. The term Non-Western is misleading, however. Colonization and globalization have blurred the boundaries between the so-called East and West, identifications, Edward Said's *Orientalism* has effectively shown us, that were fraught with misunderstandings and misinterpretations even before colonization. Nevertheless, the term at least identifies that we are looking for practices and perspectives on communication unique to and flourishing within cultures and peoples before and during periods of colonization and inter-cultural contact. For this reason, much of comparative rhetoric thus far has focused on historical studies of practices unique to certain peoples and places that differ from what we identify as Euro-American concepts of rhetoric.

To gain some perspective on a Hindu model of communication, we consider two ancient traditions, Nyaya (pronounced something like nai-ya), the philosophy of logic and debate, and Sadharanikaran (sahd-hrahn-ee-crahn), the science of performance. Nyāya is one of six orthodox Hindu philosophies and a theory of rhetoric (Lloyd, 2007; 2013; 2017). Sadharanikaran is the primary Hindu theory of performing arts, and we will focus particularly on its concept of delivery. Together they offer a starting point for exploring a Hindu theory of communication. Through the example of Hindu rhetoric, this essay attempts to show specifically how studies in comparative rhetoric can enhance our understanding of inter-cultural communication.

For context, this essay also makes references to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Lasswell's (1971) model of communication theory. Though the model is linear and does not account for “noise,” it is simple and makes clear significant commonalities and contrasts with both Nyaya and Sadharanikaran.

¹ From the nineteenth century to the present, even in much of my own publications, it is common to refer to Hindu philosophy as “Indian,” though it has never been limited to what is now India. To equate Indian with Hinduism is to ignore the reality that Hinduism extends into majority populations of Nepal and India, and significant populations in Mauritius, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, and so forth, not to mention Canada and the US. It also is insensitive to non-Hindu populations in India. For this reason, I have adopted the term “Hindu rhetoric” for the focus of this discussion.

4. Findings

Nyaya is a Hindu philosophy of reasoning and debate codified in the Nyāya Sūtraby Aksapada Gotama around 150 CE. The basic concepts and terms are traditionally ascribed to Gotama (550 BCE). Nyaya is the Sanskrit word for “justice.” Sūtra is Sanskrit for “thread,” so together they express the idea of a plumb line of justice. Interlocutors seek shared truth beyond fear, desire, and ignorance. Sadharanikaran is the Hindu science of drama, music, dance, and poetry codified in the Nāṭyaśāstra by Bhara Muni (2nd century B.C.E.). The Sanskrit term is complicated, but it is commonly translated as “simplification” (Yadava, 1987, p.165). Interlocutors, in this case, performers and audiences, seek the experience of shared emotions and communality.

4.1 Nyaya Rhetoric

Nyaya begins by noting that we know the world through four means, the pramāṇa (“perceptible to the mind”) — ways of knowing.




Figure 1. Nyaya Pramāṇa

Nyaya reasoning applies all four pramāṇa² in its five-part dialogic method, the Avayava, taught with the following exemplar:

Pramāṇa	Latinate Cognate	Avayava
Śabda	proposition	Pratijñā: The hill is on fire.
Anumāna	inference	Hetu: Because there is smoke.
Pratyakṣa	perception	Dṛṣṭānta: Smoke indicates fire in the hearth
Upamāna	comparison	Upamāna: The hill exhibits hearth-like characteristics.
Śabda	reliable testimony	Nigamana: Indeed, the hill is on fire.

The process leads us through an investigation based on a common analogy to move from potential Śabda to agreed-upon Śabda. It is a dialogic model of reasoning (Ganeri, 2005; Ingalls, 2001) that leads interlocutors (or an individual in internal debate) to the most likely conclusion. The mis-named Nyaya “syllogism” (Lloyd, 2007, pp. 369-70), the Avayava (Sanskrit for members, as in a body), is not a traditional Greek syllogism (Lloyd, 2007, p. 366; Simonson, 1946, p. 404; Ingalls, 2001, p. 133), as shown in this rendering of the Nyaya exemplar in traditional syllogistic form:

Where there is smoke there is fire.

There is smoke on the hill.

The hill is on fire.

The Nyaya method of reasoning begins with the traditional syllogism’s conclusion (it is a method of testing rather than a method of asserting proof), and rather than relying on first general premise (where there is smoke there is fire), Nyaya relies on a specific analogical example connecting the claim and the reason. Though the second element, the reason, is similar, the dṛṣṭānta is unique to avayava. Later Nyaya philosophers added vyāpti, “pervasion,” which in this case would be stated as “where there is smoke there is fire,” but they added it to the dṛṣṭānta:

Pratijñā: The hill is on fire.

Hetu: Because there is smoke.

Dṛṣṭānta: smoke indicates fire in the hearth (vyāpti: “Where there is smoke there is fire.”)

The general statement connects two elements of the dṛṣṭānta, not the claim and reason.

² Sanskrit words can be read pretty much with English pronunciations, but some symbols need explanation. The terms pratyakṣa, dṛṣṭānta, pratijñā, śabda, and dharma represent all the sounds and diacritical marks used in this essay.

- ṣ and ś are both sh sounds
- ā or any vowel marked with a line over it is lengthened
- ṛ pronounced like the final r in recur
- ñ is a nasalized as in canyon
- ṭ is pronounced by curling the tongue on the bony ridge at the front of the mouth, as in saying died and tied simultaneously.
- A consonant followed by an h, as in dharma, is aspirated. In the case of dh, the d is pronounced between the front teeth.

Currently in many regions, the final **a** is dropped, the epic story the Mahābhārata pronounced Mahābhārat, and even yoga becomes yog. Generally, however, the final **a** is like an English **ə** as in soda**a**.

As Wimal Dissanayake (1998, 1993) notes in “Foundations of Indian Verbal Communication and Phenomenology,” “While Western thinkers fashioned language into an instrument to explore and comprehend reality, the Hindus... tried to bypass it. Whenever Hindu thinkers and philosophers were confronted with the problem of explaining reality, they avoided logical and discursive language and made use of analogies and metaphors” ([emphasis mine] 43). Though Nyaya does emphasize logical communication, it does so by including analogies and metaphors. If we compare Nyaya to a simple model, Lasswell’s model of communication theory, we can note the similarities and differences. In both cases there is a communicator and a message. Nyaya identifies the medium as Avayava, the five-part method. It refers to three types of debate that use the Avayava, jalpa (“speaking nonsense”), arguing to win, and vitaṇḍā (“trivial objection”), arguing only against. Though the user of Nyaya reasoning should be skilled in all three, the Sūtrain in its terminology identifies jalpa and vitanda as unfruitful, and identifies a third type of debate, vada, as the only one that bears positive fruit (phala).




Figure 2. Nyaya and Lasswell’s Communication Theory. Image from Novak (2019).

In Nyayavada reasoning then, interlocutors enter dialogue focused on vada, shared truth, using avayava, their shared five-part method of reasoning (NS I.1.32, p.13). The goal of the dialogue is to find solutions and perspectives, prama, “knowing episodes,” that prove to be phala, fruitful for all involved. Ultimately, the goal is for interlocutors to see the world as it is, and thus attain a state of moksa, liberation from desire, fear, misapprehension, and the cycle of birth, pain, and death (NS I.1.2, p.2).




Figure 3. Nyaya Vada

Hindu, as well as Buddhist and Jain writings, since they adopted Nyaya methods, are replete with examples of Nyaya reasoning. They usually appear in order at key moments in the “argument” of the text. For example, in the *SimhasanaDvatrimsika* (Kshemendra. 2007, pp.161-2; Lloyd, 2015, p. 2) we find the people speaking persuasively with their king after one of his beneficent acts:

Unmindful of your own ease, you endure pains every day for the sake of your people.

[Because] It is your nature

like the tree taking the sun to provide shade.

It is interesting that the passage both commends the king’s action and reminds him of his dharma, to act in accordance with his karmic duty as a Kshatriya (warrior), to protect and seek the best for his people. This combination of statement, reason, and analogy uniquely combines elements of Aristotle’s enthymeme (claim and reason) and paradigm (example) (Lloyd, 2011, pp. 84-92).

4.2 Sadharanikaran Theory of Delivery

Before we discuss Sadharanikaran’s theory of delivery, for comparison we might look to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. He notes there that rhetorical delivery is important due to “defects in the hearers” (τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρία), who cannot follow elaborate philosophical arguments. He values the What over the How, even categorizing the rhetor as charming rather than convincing the audience:

“The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer” (ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ’ ἐστί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν) (Rhetoric III 1 1409-12).

Only logos, the message, really matters, and delivery here implies that the rhetor is dressing up the message so others will accept it and act on it, rather than tailoring it for audience benefit: “the whole business of rhetoric [is] concerned with appearances” (τῆς περιτήρητορικῆς νοῦς ὡς ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος ἄλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον), and the rhetor’s goal is to neither annoy nor delight the listeners (μὴ τελοπεῖν μὴ τ’ εὐφραίνειν) (Rhetoric III 1 1405; 1406).

While Indians also stress factual importance, the idea that persuasion involves “appearances” designed to reach a “defective” audience is completely foreign. The Sūtra even directly states that Nyaya reasoning, using *dr̥ṣṭānta* “about which an ordinary man and an expert have the same opinion”, (NS I:1: 25, p. 11), is designed for people of various statuses to understand it. It is a failure if they do not. As Dissanayake (1988, 1993) notes, “Indians [use] language in conformity with logic that support[s] their thinking and which was markedly different from Aristotelian logic” (p.45).

As noted above, the term *Sadharanikaran* has been interpreted differently by different communication scholars. As Adhikary notes, Vedantatirtha (1936, p. 35) notes that “The term *sadharanikaran* is derived from the Sanskrit word “*sadharan*” “or generalized presentation;” Yadava (1998, p. 187) translates it as “simplification;” and Dissanayake (2006, p. 4) translates it as “universalization.” Adhikary adds that the term is “bound with another concept, *sahridayata*, that is, a state of common orientation, commonality or oneness (Adhikary, 2009, pp. 69-70). This leads him to summarize by saying that *Sadharanikaran* is the attainment of *sahridayata* by communicating parties (Adhikary, 2009, p. 70).

In a *Sadharanikaran* model of communication, the *Sahridaya*, inspired by a mood, thought, emotion or idea (*bhavas*), encodes it (*abhiyanjana*) into a message (*sandesha*) recognizable to the senses using a channel (*sarani*) which the receiver decodes (*rasawadana*).

Sadridaya → *bhavas* → *abhiyanjana* → *sandesha* → *sarani* → *rasawadana* → *Sadridaya*
 sender inspiration encoding message channel decoding receiver
 Adhikary (2009) provides a more elaborate model.




Figure 4. Adhikary’s *Sadharanikaran* Communicative Model

In Sadharanikaran, the sender, or sahridaya “is a person in such state of emotional intensity which is coequal or parallel to that of other(s) engaged in communication.” What is unique, however, is that the receiver ideally is in the same state as the sender, so they are also sahridaya,” and “Both parties are engaged in the processes of abhivyanjana and rasaswadana.” In Sadharanikaran, communication is not just information transference, it also includes purposeful conveyance of shared emotional states of being. As Adhikary (2009) notes, “When sadharanikaran is successful, universalization or commonness of experience takes place.” As with Nyaya, we can map Adhikary’s model onto Lasswell’s model, highlighting shifts in the ways senders, receivers, and channel, result in an effect.




Figure 5. Adhikary’s Sadharanikaran and Lasswell’s Model of Communication

To simplify, speakers, actors, and audience members enter into a common orientation which opens both, as sahridaya, to embodying and expressing various emotional states, or bhava. Shared bhava are called rasa, roughly “tasting.” What is shared is not just the bhava or rasa themselves, but the sense of wholeness and oneness that shared states of being make possible, sadharanikaran. The *NatyaŚāstra*, following Vedic Hinduism, identifies this state as “Ananda,” which translates as joy. However, it is not a temporary state. One is accessing something within that surpasses desire, fear, and ignorance. In other traditions we might refer to it as a state of grace or gratitude for life itself, what is eternal within us.

Yadava (1987) offers an example of Sadharanikaran happening in casual contexts when “One person makes a point, someone strongly contradicts him, others support one view or the other expressed during the course of discussion or gossip session; occasionally, all burst into laughter and then proceed with their chit chat. They are Sahridayas [practitioners of Sadharanikaran] having Rasa” [communion of emotional state of joy and commonality] (From Yadava, 1987, p. 170). As this example illustrates, Sadharanikaran can occur in all shared experiences, from everyday to sublime.

In Yadava’s example one can also hear echoes of Nyaya vada in his description: “One person makes a point, someone strongly contradicts him, others support one view or the other expressed during the course of discussion ...” Compare that with the *NyāyaSūtra*’s description of vada: “Discussion (vāda) is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analyzed in the form of the five members [the Nyāya method] and decided by any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation...” (NS I. 2. 42 p.19).

4.3 Analysis of Nyaya and Sadharanikaran

The goals of both Nyaya and Sadharanikaran, then, are very similar. For Nyaya, Nyayavada leads to a process of liberation for interlocutors as they together strip away illusions and confront

the realities of existence: “Pain, birth, activity, faults, and misapprehension—on the successive annihilation of these in reverse order, there follows release” (*mokṣa*) (NS I. 1. 2. p. 2). In Sadharanikaran, according to Yadava, the Sadridaya “not only accepts the message willingly but in the process derives genuine satisfaction and pleasure or Ananda” ... “the difference between the “I” and “Others” diminishes in his heart” (Yadava, 1998, p. 167).

This chart summarizes some key differences and similarities among Aristotelian Rhetoric, Nyaya Reasoning, and Sadharanikaran:

Aristotelian Rhetoric				
<i>Relation</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Goal</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Cultural Uses</i>
<u>Rhetor</u>	enthymeme/	movement to	transmission	politics
<u>Pre-eminent</u>	<u>examples</u>	<u>rhetor's p.o.v.</u>		<u>law</u>
	<u>linguistic</u>	persuasion		public speaking
Nyāya				
<i>Relation</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Goal</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Cultural Uses</i>
<u>Agreed</u>	claim/ reason/	shared	dialogic	liberation (<i>mokṣa</i>)
<u>Equality</u>	analogy	truth	ritual	finding solutions
	<u>linguistic/</u>	dialogue		school identification
	<u>imagistic</u>	agreement		
Sadharanikaran				
<i>Relation</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Goal</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Cultural Uses</i>
<u>guru/śiṣya</u>	encoding/	communion	transmission/	<u>mokṣa</u>
	<u>decoding</u>	collective	ritual	social normativity
	<u>multimedial</u>	action		cultural transmission
<i>Transmission</i> communication resembles the traditional Western model of sender/ message./media/ receiver				
<i>Dialogic</i> communication emphasizes interplay and exchange among interlocutors				
<i>Ritual</i> communication, according to J. W. Carey (cited in <u>Adhikary</u>) is communication between people sharing common social assumptions and conventions.				

Figure 6. Aristotelian Rhetoric, Nyaya, and Sadharanikaran Compared

Each approach to reasoning both differs and overlaps with the other approaches. These are broad generalizations which serve only as starting points for further learning.

In Aristotelian rhetoric, the rhetor controls the presentation using either enthymemes or examples to move the audience to the rhetor's position. Aristotle isolates rhetoric from logic, which he applies to what we might call the sciences, and limits rhetoric to the realm of the possible, rather than the certain, politics, law, and public speeches (praise or blame).

Nyaya interlocutors enter a dialogic relationship of relative equality making claims and reasons based on an analogical connection. While Aristotle frames rhetoric as entirely linguistic, Nyaya, by promoting analogies to the center of reasoning, adds an imagistic element, since analogies often translate visually in the mind. The goal is to create shared truth beneficial to all

interlocutors. Nyaya applies to any dialogue, and was applied to ritualistic debates between ancient Hindus and other schools of thought, still as a tool for liberation and fruitful solutions. Sadharanikaran most often applied in a guru/śiṣya context, at least metaphorically, as actors, musicians, dancers, poets, etc, were expected to be the teachers and transmitters of society. When they perform, their embodiments are informed by hundreds, even thousands of years of traditions concerning body, eyes, gestures, musical scales, color meaning, even how stages were constructed. In fact, the *Natyaśāstra* provides every detail needed for performance, linking type of emotion to physicality and movement. Its goal was communal experience of oneness, as well as communal action, which is really the goal of all three approaches. Sadharanikaran, in creating a sense of community, functions both as promoting social normativity and cultural transmission.

5. Discussion and Implications

The field of intercultural communication often applies Euro-American communication theories to practices in “Non-Western” contexts to better understand contexts and assumptions behind communications across various languages and borders. For instance, Bennett’s (2013) Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) provides a “framework that explains how people experience and handle cultural difference” by interpreting observations “about how people become more competent intercultural communicators” in “both academic and corporate settings” through *constructivist psychology* and *communication theory*. Its purpose is to “organize these observations into positions along a continuum of increasing sensitivity to cultural difference.”[emphasis mine]. While such approaches prove useful, a knowledge of indigenous theories of rhetoric and communication would provide a much fuller framework than just Euro-American theories.

For instance, most people influenced by Euro-American thinking about persuasion assume speakers are trying to influence others to that person’s way of thinking. Knowledge of Nyaya rhetoric reminds us that reasoners also may speak, not as individuals, but as concerned members of a community, applying the conventions and assumptions of that community to create a shared base of understanding and action. Dryzek (2002) calls this “bridging rhetoric,” an often-neglected perspective in interpreting persuasive human communication. According to Dryzek, “bonding is associating with people who are similar in social background, bridging is associating with people with different social characteristics.” He adds, bonding rhetoric “is likely to deepen divisions with out-groups, to invoke dangerous emotions, to mobilize passions, to move groups to extremes” (p. 328). Bridging rhetoric fits more with the goals of both Intercultural Communication and Comparative Rhetoric by taking seriously “the outlooks (ideally, the discursive psychology) of an intended audience that is different in key respects from the speaker and from the kind of people or discourses the speaker represents” (p. 328). Knowledge of both Dryzek’s bridging and Nyaya rhetoric reminds us that dialogue may be much more than a means of expression; it can provide a pathway to true intercultural dialogue and liberation from ignorance, fear, and mis-placed desires for interlocutors.

Knowledge of comparative rhetoric also helps move communication theory beyond just mental and informational frameworks. Though Bennett (2013) notes that “Communication is much more than a simple transmission of information: it is the mutual creation of meaning. Information is not, in itself, meaningful; it is only when information is intended and interpreted in some way that it attains significance,” his model and method are still linguistic and

informational. Theories like Sadharanikaran actually focus in detail on how emotions and moods are conveyed.

In Bennett's (2013) example of how two people convey meaning, he interprets the exchange of one person trying to talk about a film they like to another person: "You pose the information in a language I know, use references to concepts and other films I might know, and in conveying your feeling you assume that I am able and willing to access your experience." Theories like Nyaya and Sadharanikaran complicate this process by reminding us that the exchange is not just linguistic and informational, but also conventional and emotional. A person from another culture may apply an entirely different logic and framework for conveying emotions that the interpreter may miss entirely due to Euro-American frameworks.

For instance, many Euro-Americans mis-understand the characterizations and dancing in Bollywood films, emphasizing that the main characters are rather undeveloped and clichéd, the dancing sequences over the top and inadequately integrated into the story. However, from the point of view of Sadharanikaran, the actor is supposed to be a prototype, originally as idealized husbands, wives, lovers, even Gods. From the point of view of the NatyaŚastra, the dancing is meant to convey rasa, leading to Sadharanikaran. Their purpose is to help us enter the emotions of the characters and an experience of human community, not just to forward the plot.

Ultimately, the goals of Comparative Rhetoric and Intercultural Communication are similar. As Bennett (2013) notes, "It is certainly a criterion of good communication that people seek to understand the intentions of each other in non-evaluative ways." For those practicing intercultural communication, knowledge of comparative rhetoric expands models of communication and rhetoric beyond Greco-Roman, Euro-American concepts, adds indigenous perspectives on communication, and provides alternative research approaches, terminologies, resources, and methodologies.

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