Framing of Fundamentalism in the Digital Media Space

Clyde A. MISSIER

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands

Abstract: This paper seeks to understand the relationship between media and the framing of religious fundamentalism in the digital media space. It investigates the fundamentalism phenomenon through concepts of mass communication and framing theories, and examines several empirical findings of framing of fundamentalism in Canada, France, the Netherlands and India. This inquiry is also an attempt to examine and review the current literature and definitions of religious fundamentalism in the humanities and social sciences. This paper argues that the symbolic constructs and frames in the media of extreme beliefs and their activists are biased and incomplete, and considers the implications for further research in digital media and religious fundamentalism.

Keywords: Religion, fundamentalism, framing, digital media, social media.

1.   Introduction

The transition from analogue to digital has probably become the meta-context of the new millennium and opened possibilities for the public to directly access content around the globe. In a world without the internet, the geographical location of resources used was limited. However, today, the direct access to the World Wide Web has reduced humans' locational dependence. People are globally encouraged to seek information and communicate about their needs. Internet-facilitated digital apps fueled with cutting edge technology have reshaped our world and empowered citizens around the globe to connect and keep our new digital social economy going. Sadly the internet and our digital technologies have also enabled different forms of dynamics. The social media networks, arguably the embodiment of our direct-access society [1], also disseminate the global ferocity of today's hate, violence, xenophobia, hyper-ethnocentrism and conspiracy theories. These ferocities are exacerbated by the global rise of religious fundamentalism and right wing extremist organizations which have the potential to disrupt societies.

The cutting-edge technologies of the late 19th and 20th century's industrial revolution deprived and marginalized humans and unleashed radical views such as communism, fascism (Salzman, 2008, p. 219) and right-wing Christian fundamentalism in the US (Moore, 1993, pp. 45- 49). The ongoing digital revolution has created a new online-media sphere filtered through the prism of lethal social media apps which also makes us question how human activity, groups and audiences are represented in the new digital media space; it is therefore important to examine frames of extreme beliefs and strong religious movements and the characteristics of their activists, whom we often call: religious fundamentalists. Various scholars (Juergensmeyer, 2017; Clarke, 2017; Salzman, 2008; Ruthven, 2007; Droogers, 2005; Appleby, 2003) have tried to find

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[1] Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor describes the "direct-access" society as follows: "We have moved from a hierarchical order of personalized links to an impersonal egalitarian one; from a vertical world of mediated- access to horizontal, direct-access societies" (Taylor, C. 2007, p.209).

causes that drive humans towards fundamentalism, some suggested that fundamentalism is the manifestation of resistance against moral decay or cultural declinism, against mingling with other religions and syncretism, neo-colonialism or Western imperialism, modernity, globalization, global capitalism, and so on.

In the media, frames of religious groups that are constructed with reinforced values and ideologies, can have a decisive role in the perception of their identities and representations by the public. This process of influencing the audience's attitudes and behavior we call framing. Much of the recent wave of academic literature on religious fundamentalism is concerned with reviewing and critiquing the work of other scholars on how Western nations are struggling with both the rise of strong religious beliefs in diasporic communities, framed in popular (digital) media as fundamentalism, and increasingly with white right-wing extremism. In the literature there is a common assumption that fundamentalism is naturally rooted in the five major contemporary religious communities (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism).

Digital media and its arguably notorious social media apps are not the exclusive space of mainstream religion, but a preferred toy to bolster religious extremism. We have witnessed in digital media how a French high school teacher was brutally decapitated by a young Muslim extremist for showing controversial cartoons to his pupils; a terrorist attack in a busy restaurant district in Vienna, Austria; three French church-goers killed in a knife attack in Nice and more than 50 people brutally beheaded in northern Mozambique by militant Muslim fanatics; and the new year (2021) started with the news that seventy civilians had been killed by suspected militants previously linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in Niger, Africa. More recently, we witnessed how former US's beleaguered president Donald Trump incited right-wing extremists through hate speech footage and endorsed conspiracy theories on social media networks, leading to a deadly clash and an unprecedented assault on the heart of US democracy on January 6 th, 2021.

Our question here is: *How are digital mass media facilitating the framing of religious groups we call fundamentalists?* I argue that the constructs and frames in the media of extreme beliefs and their activists are biased and incomplete. This article gives an overview of the study of fundamentalism over time and reviews the framing constructs that address religious fundamentalism. The collected data does not cover all articles ever published on this phenomenon, yet it combines journals, books from the humanities and social sciences as well as recent online media sources. By looking at several cases of frames of fundamentalism in the literature, we will explore a different interpretation of fundamentalism which enables us to reorient the framing of religious fundamentalists.

The outline of this paper is as follows: (1) First, I describe and introduce the mechanism behind media and framing theories. The work of Wilbur Schram and other scholars is presented to understand the relationship between religion, fundamentalism and the digitalized global media. (2) Secondly, the discourse on fundamentalism and definitions on fundamentalism of various scholars are summarized; this article discusses the three modalities of fundamentalism in the democratic society: complaisant, democratic- coalition - buildingand excessive fundamentalism. (3) Lastly, selected examples of framing patterns in the media are discussed: 1) Canadian Christian fundamentalism; 2) French Islamism; 3) Framing of Muslims in the Netherlands; 4) Framing of Islamophobia and Hinduphobia in India. This article concludes by

discussing the relationship between digital media and contemporary (religious) fundamentalism, and outlining further implications for future empirical research.

2.   Preliminaries: Mass Media, Modernity & Fundamentalism

2.1   Mass Media

In the past twenty years religious fundamentalism came to us on radio, television and print, yet increasingly the atrocities of this global phenomenon also emerge on digital media.

Around the globe people access digital media all the time and witness the representation, constructs and frames of religious fundamentalism. To understand the framing of fundamentalism in the digital media space we therefore need to address the basic conceptsof mass media and framing theories.

The first flow of cyber-religion also revealed that contemporary digital media technologies are not only used for the study of religion or how to practice rituals online, but were, reluctantly, embraced by the former Taliban Government in Afghanistan. At first digital media technology was rejected by the Taliban as it considered it a demonic Western tool to spread "perverted, immoral and anti-Islamic content", but later the leaders discovered the power of the internet, as well as the opportunity to communicate their theological ideas to a global audience (Højsgaard & Warburg, 2005). The Taliban paved the way for other organizations with terror in mind to disseminate content on the evolving digital mass media. Today the internet and the social media apps are increasingly subjugated and weaponized for political propaganda practices, disinformation, fake news, dehumanizing opponents, publications of false statements and conspiracy theories around the globe (Introvigne, 2005; Bjola & Pamment, 2019).

There is a vast literature on mass communication and framing. In his monograph *Responsibility in mass communication*[2] Wilbur Schramm stated seven decades ago that mass communication always mirrors the social and political concepts of the society within which it operates (Schramm, 1957). Schramm's concepts of ethics in mass communication will help us understand the biased, hostile constructs and frames toward fundamentalism mirrored in the present globalized digital media system (GDMS) concept and its most "lethal" disruptive application: social media. These are internet-based platforms built on user-generated shared content and follow Schramm's social responsibility (SR) theory, where mass communication(1) serves as a platform for the exchange of comment and criticism; (2) represents the pluriform groups in society; (3) demystifies objectives and values in society and (4) gives access to all relevant data. This concept was primarily developed by Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK, Canada and Western European countries (Schramm, 1953). Let's take a closer look at GDMS and how it developed as a mass communications concept, as well as at its ethics

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[2]Schramm, W. (1957) introduced the four concepts of mass communication: Authoritarian, based on authoritarian religion and philosophy; Libertarian, based on philosophy of rationalism and natural rights; Communist (Soviet Union), Marxist, Leninist and Stalinist views; Social Responsibility, based on Western changes in the media, new thinking by media scholars and philosophers. In this regard, we can ask the following questions: 1.Where has the concept been developed? 2. On which theory or philosophy it the concept based? 3. What is its chief purpose? 4. By whom can the media be used? 5. Who controls the media? 6. When are media forbidden? 7. Who has ownership? 8. How does the concept differ from former concepts?

and responsibilities.

1. Where was the concept developed? The Internet as we know it has its roots in a diverse set of industrial economies, but US companies successfully commercialized it with critical innovation and new applications (Mowery & Simcoe, 2001; Greenstein, 2010).

2. What is the concept based on? Contrary to Schramm's four other concepts, though GDMS enhances the freedom of speech exponentially, it is not based on an ideology or new philosophy, but rather on innovative media application, such as gaming and social media.

3. What is its chief purpose? This is very similar to SR and Libertarian: to sell, entertain and inform, but also to create a platform for debate, discover truth and check on economic,political and social stakeholders.

4. By whom can the digital media be used? For the first time in history we have technology which gives everyone, in a democratic not state-controlled society, who has something to say, direct access to communicate topics around the globe and influence a globalaudience.

5. Who controls the digital media? Nobody controls the Internet; however governments can block any unwanted content, website or social media platform from other governments, businesses and reputable, famous or ordinary people. For example, the world's most popular social media giants like YouTube, Instagram, Pinterest and Twitter are blocked by mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) in favor of homegrown Chinese social media networks such as WeChat, Sina Weibo and Youku Tudou, as Beijing policymakers consider the foreign network a serious threat to the social and political stability in mainland China[3].

6. To whom are the digital media forbidden? Social media companies have policies and are defining the balance between what should be forbidden and appropriate content on social media. In various countries around the globe, social media companies have had to adhere to national privacy legislations and change their policy on the privacy of its users. They also have spent years dealing with the radicalizing result of its algorithms. In order to recover from a bad reputation and criticism from pressure groups, social media companies started combating misinformation and conspiracy theories, as well as removing fake profiles and radical (political and religious) content that was linked to extremist groups.

7. Who has ownership? The biggest digital media and entertainment companies are US conglomerates such as AT&T, CNN and HBO. The most influential social media applications(Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Youtube and Whatsapp) are also owned by US stock listed companies and by Chinese (Government-controlled) corporations such as WeChat, Tiktok and Sina Weibo.8. What is the essential difference with Schramm's other four concepts? In a democratic country it is impossible to exclude the mass of the population from discussion and decision-making. It also gives a person the opportunity to get instant attention and engage in online activism, construct a digital profile, connect with other users on the platform around the globe, build digital communities and become an influencer or independent journalist (Kane, Alavi, Labianca & Borgatti, 2014).

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[3] World famous social networks banned on mainland China.
 Retrieved 28.10.2020https://www.statista.com/statistics/558221/number-of-facebook-users-in-china/

GDMS also personifies the ideology of the so-called *economy of attention*[4] fueled by the social media networks' advertising business model. Users (consumers) have little attention to give, therefore businesses, organizations and governments ongoingly contest in cyberspace for the user's attention, in case they want to shift their values, (re)construct their lifestyles, introduce various experiences and cultural practices (Franck, 2018; Vaidhyanathan, 2018). The shifting power of journalistic media organizations to the burgeoning role of social media can also be examined by Pierre Bourdieu[5]'s notion of *habitus* and social space. Habitus are "structured structures" which classify the space and behavior of an individual in society, "the way he expresses, his political opinion, his agencies and so on". The direct access to social media apps has given ordinary people a new social space and the power to reach a global audience, build networks and a vehicle to make news, edit and frame stories without the intervention of traditional media industry in a new global media sphere.

The social media platforms may have disrupted the mainstream media landscape, news dissemination and connected the people of world to their networks; however, the tycoons that gatekeep news to this day belong to the ruling elite (Hamelink, 2011). Indeed, the new players did not disrupt the existing media monopoly of what Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman call the Propaganda Model[6]. This media framework emphasizes the inequality of wealth and power in society and the ability of the elite to orchestrate journalistic choices, control mass media and governments to filter news and influence the public's opinion (Chomsky & Herman, 2002).

In *Anti-Social Media*, communication scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan (2018) argues that social media networks are facilitating governments to use the platforms as organized state terror to oppress minorities or discredit political opponents, for example: Anti-immigration speech on American Facebook news feeds, "troll farms" on Facebook India to discredit people's reputation, calls on Facebook Myanmar to boycott Muslim business owners and ban interfaith marriages. Recent research also shows that general misinformation, conspiracy theories, and religious communication on social media networks have revealed themselves as effective "stimulus" tools to spread fake news on Covid-19 (Barua, Barau, Aktar, Kabir & Li, 2020; Alimardani & Elswah, 2020). Mahsa Alimardani and Mona Elswah's study into religious (Islamic) communication, misinformation and digital activism on social media during the 2020 coronavirus pandemic in North Africa and the Middle East, concluded that certain religious Muslim leaders are spreading false remedies to fight Covid-19 from various types of social media platforms. Digital activism and cyber mobilization by religious groups on social media networks are defining new boundaries for religious dynamics and authority, as they are the reason behind why religious fake news is contributing to the ongoing infodemic (Alimardani & Elswah, 2020).

In sum, frames in the digital media space can be addressed as: Influential constructs of fragmented amorphous realities enhanced by rhetoric, metaphors, pictures and videos

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[4] On the internet content has grown abundantly; therefore, attention from the content user has become increasingly a scarce commodity in the digitalized global economy (Franck, 2018; Vaidhyanathan, 2018).

[5] Bourdieu, P. (1996) Physical Space, Social Space and Habitus. Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsgeografi, Universiteteti Oslo. Retrieved 15.12.2020 from: https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/62141626/ Physical_Space_Social_Space_and_Habitus.

[6] Essential components of this model are: (1) The size and concentration of ownership, (2) Advertising as main source of income, (3) Reliance of media to get information from governments and corporations, (4) PR-agencies and spokespersons as agency to discipline media, (5) Anti-communism as national religion.

which deliver people a meaningful context in their social world on public discourses, cultures, politics, fundamentalism and so on.

2.2   How Does Fundamentalism Relate to Modernity

As we try to get a firmer grip on the exact relation between fundamentalism and modernity, we have to realize that the seed of today's global atrocities, terror, violence, agitation and conflicts we today associate with Muslim fundamentalism was to some extent put down more than a millennium ago by Persian-born political activist, intellectual and reformer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97). He lived in an age of European expansion in many Muslim countries and in order to revive the Islamic society emphasized the shared values and helped foment the widely felt hatred against ongoing Western imperialism and colonialism[7].

The Western world always felt the urgency to protect its interests in order to maintain its economic and military power, but lacked the understanding of the basic religious and philosophical fundamentals of other cultures and the ways these nations see their interests (Huntington, 1993, p. 49). Al-Afghani laid the philosophical foundations of the Muslim activism and fundamentalism to combat Western imperialism and expansion into Muslim countries (Kramer, 1995). More recently, Muslim fundamentalist movements had their growth and upsurge in the aftermath of the Cold War, followed by the victory of global capitalism over Soviet Union's fractured planned economy. After the 9/11 events global news media and particularly Western politicians have appropriated the meaning of fundamentalism from scholars and given their own popular definition associated with Islamism, terrorism and violence (Droogers, 2005).

John Berger (2018) has categorized fundamentalism and various extreme right-wing groups under the umbrella of extremism. Berger emphasizes that extremism is particularly about hostility, violence, discriminatory behavior and that the members of the in-group[8] consider themselves to be morally superior to those of the out-group. He defines extremism as follows:

> *Extremism refers to the belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group. The hostile action must be part of the in-group's definition of success (Berger, 2018, 44)*

Many scholars (Marty & Scott Appleby, 1993, 2002; Ruthven, 2007; Salzman, 2008, Clarke, 2016; Peels, 2020) have stated the word "fundamentalism" was used to describe Christian Protestants, who in the beginning of the 20th century opposed against the established scientific community and the immigration of Jews and Catholics to the US. They believed that their Protestant-Christian values and way of life were in danger and established a new fundamentalist creationism movement to teach their "theory" in

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[7] Kramer, M. (1996) Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1996, pp. 37-49. Retrieved 5.12.2020 from: https://www.meforum.org/304/fundamentalist-islam-at-large-the-drive-for-power

[8] Henri Tajfel's social identity theory: In-group members have more self-esteem from being a member of a certain group and see, as the result of social categorization, all members of the out-group as inferior and having the same characteristics. Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *1*(2), 149–178. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420010202

schools in the US and campaign around the globe. Today the use of "fundamentalism" is not confined to right-wing Christians in the US. It is often associated with other religious and non-religious groups, as well as insurgent organizations.

Marty and Appleby (1993) emphasize in their Fundamentalism Project that religious groups can turn to fundamentalism and extreme doctrines if they are struggling to uphold their identity, for example as a result of the rise of secular[9] modernity. Various others have noticed that Mary and Appleby's studies do not directly identify fundamentalism with elements of violence and terrorism. Similarly, the Encyclopedia Britannica[10] describes fundamentalism *"as type of conservative religious movement characterized by the advocacy of strict conformity to sacred texts"*.

Indeed, by many authors fundamentalism is nowadays identified with elements of violence, for example Sathianathan Clarke (2017) sees religious fundamentalism as part of today's "world's violence" and he defines religious fundamentalism as an "aggressive movement" striving for world supremacy. Mark Juergensmeyer (2017) mentions that various religious communities have "cultures of violence" and it is the challenge to get in the "minds of these terrorists". Theologian Max Stackhouse (1995) argues that fundamentalism transcends demographic, ethnic and cultural borders. All religions have fundamentalist subgroups that may emerge, who legitimize militant action against secularists, unbelievers or other religious groups when fundamentals of that faith are endangered or disregarded. This narrative is echoed by psychologists Bob Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger (1992; 2004; 2005) who define fundamentalism as dogmatic religious teaching convinced of its eternal truth, as well as a phenomenon that "usually can be viewed as a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism", which becomes manifest as a blend of hostility towards other worldviews and obedient behavior towards in-group authority and leadership. However, Michael Salzman (2003, 2008) describes fundamentalism as an "anxiety driven alternative ideology" for those human beings who are looking for self-esteem and have the need for an "anxiety-buffer" against the terror of modernity. For those who feel deprived and suppressed in society, a heroic death means redemption. In a similar manner Pradip Ninan Thomas (2008) argues that commitment to a joint identity, affirmation of shared values and the fear of modernity are some of the key characteristics religious fundamentalists have in common.

Discontented with the present radicalization model in fundamentalist studies, Dutch philosopher and theologian Rik Peels (2020) explains in 'Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief' that in the evolving discourse of fundamentalism the pathology model, as well as the radicalization model are not conclusive and fail to have the convincing power to explain why some turn to fundamentalist beliefs while others do not. Peels (2020) argues that the time is ripe for "a philosophical model, based on thorough empirical inquiry, that can explain how normal, often rational people can make the turn to fundamentalism and how they are still responsible for doing so".

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[9] According to Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2007), the secularization theory is based on various factions of secularity: 1. Retreat of religion in public life, 2. Decline of religious practice and belief, 3. The rise of the humanist alternative. In Europe and the US, religious practice rose in 19th and to a certain extend in the 20th century but gradually declined; the process secularization and "dechristianization" show a steady decline since the 1960s. Taylor, C. (2007) A Secular Age. Narratives of Secularization. The age of mobilization. pp. 423-472.

[10]   Encyclopedia   Britannica.   Fundamentalism.   Retrieved   29-11-2020   from: https://www.britannica.com/topic/fundamentalism

Whereas some authors identify fundamentalism with religious activists who justify violence or consider fundamentalism to be synonym for terrorism, Peels[11] (2020) has a different approach, which he claims is more unbiased, clear and applicable for a more open- minded research into religious activism. Peels defines 'fundamentalism' as follows:

> *"A movement is fundamentalist if and only if (i) it is reactionary towards modern developments, (ii) it is itself modern, and (iii) it is based on a grand historical narrative. More specifically, a movement is fundamentalist if it exemplifies a large number of the following properties: (i) it is reactionary in its rejection of liberal ethics, science, or technological exploitation, (ii) it is modern in seeking certainty and control, embracing literalism and infallibility about particular scriptures, actively using media and technology, or making universal claims, and (iii) it presents a grand historical narrative in terms of paradise, fall, and redemption, or cosmic dualism."*

Just like Marty and Appleby, Peels' "Bigfam[12]" definition regards fundamentalism as an umbrella (family) name that entails "a family" with peaceful loved ones, while others are not violent but secretly endorse violence, e.g. through anonymous social media posts, and distant relatives who openly support and commit violence, whom we in general classify as terrorists. Some of the family members are complaisant, while others who may feel marginalized in society still pursue democratic legislative road maps to change policies in countries where they may be part of an ethnic or religious minority group. The extreme fundamentalists are the radicalized believers who are inclined to violence and terrorism.

Many of the abovementioned authors argue that there is a relationship between fundamentalism and modernity. If so, why is modernity so important to understand fundamentalism? Charles Taylor argues in *A Secular Age* [13] that Western modernity is an "underlying idea of order" which shaped our modern social imaginaries: These are the constructs of how ordinary people imagine their social existence, their deeper normative notions and images which underlie their normal expectations in the modern world. Taylor argues that phenomena such as fanatism and religious fundamentalism are a part of modernity and that secularized Western countries have a deeply rooted fear of extreme beliefs and terrorism. He points out that today's anxiety or "social panic" is comparable with the "Grande Peur" of the French Revolution of 1789. This societal anxiety is created by the establishment as they fear that "evil forces" are undermining the existing social order.

In Taylor's narrative our secular age has become a schizophrenic[14] pluralist world in which many people are puzzled and feel deeply cross-pressured between two polar positions: belief and unbelief. They want to support the entrenchment of the scientific immanent order and at the same time feel anxious about their social existence and the effects of theologically inspired violence/terrorism or other, secular forms of extreme beliefs, e.g. fascism, militant atheism, etc. These cross-pressures are part of the modern secularization theory and have resulted in what Taylor called the: "Immanent Frame"

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[11] Peels, R. (2020) "Defining 'Fundamentalism", *unpublished paper.*

[12] Bigfam (big family) is an umbrella name to define fundamentalism movements as a group with overlapping "family resemblance".

[13] Taylor, 2007, pp.88-89.

[14] Taylor, 2007, p.727.

(IF), which is a construct of modernity to generate and enhance "the trust in modern science and establish materialism"[15]. People sometimes make a closed immanent spin toward the "Closed World Structures" (CWS), such as narratives of subtraction/disenchantment stories, exclusive humanism, ethic of authenticity and Nietzsche's Death-of-God theory. However, at the same time, people make a transcendental spin, it is therefore an "unthought" that people in secularized countries never "open" up for transcendence, epiphanic experiences, spirituality and remain in the comfort of unbelief and the narratives of CWS.

Summing up, the relationship between religious fundamentalism and modernity in our post-industrial age can be characterized as a tension between the chaotic globalized modern world with a super nova[16] of beliefs and individuals who increasingly feel unmoored, estranged and disembedded from society and seek a meaning of life to satisfy their needs.

Religious fundamentalism can offer human beings what seems to be a profound sense of purpose in society, inner peace and belonging to an exclusive religious in-group.

2.3.   Spectrum of Fundamentalism

Defining fundamentalism is a complex matter and not limited to one particular worldview. However, the Appendix gives a literature overview of works from a broad range of scholars in the humanities and social sciences on the diverse characteristics of religious fundamentalism. Based on this literature review I have assessed its destructive impact on secularized democratic societies and identified how this phenomenon fits in our modern moral order which validates our universal human rights and welfare as crucial goods (Taylor, 2007, 608). I have focused on the defining characteristics of religious fundamentalism by Marty and Appleby (1993, 2002) and Peels (2021) that, firstly, religious fundamentalism movements share "family resemblances" and secondly, not all fundamentalists are violent extremists or religiously-inspired terrorists. Additionally, I have distilled variables (mentioned in Table 1), as well as three ways to view the various characteristics of fundamentalism. The fundamentalist categories are: Complaisant, Democratic and Radical.

Table 1. The Three Categories of Fundamentalism: Complaisant, Democratic and Radical.

Variables	A) Complaisant	B) Democratic	C) Radical
Democracy	Does not believe in democratic values. Prefers religious authoritarianism, against pluralism and other worldviews.	Believes in democratic values and accepts pluralism as status quo.	Does not believe in democratic values. Preferring religious authoritarianism, against pluralism and other worldviews.

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[15] Taylor, 2007, pp.560-561.

[16] The Nova Effect: "widening gamut of new positions, some believing, some unbelieving, some hard to classify, which have become available options for us" (Taylor, 2007, p. 424).

Ideology	Dogmatical belief in religion and strong beliefs (i.e. ultra-conservative and ultra-orthodox subgroups). Want to return to glorious historical past.	Dogmatical belief in religion and imagined state and open-mindedness (i.e. democratic right-wing religious political parties)	Dogmatical belief in religion and closed-mindedness (i.e. one religious party system). Want to return to glorious historical past.
Modernity	Openly against secular modernity, atheism and liberal ethics. Does not rely on political change in democratic society.	Against secular modernity, atheism and liberal ethics. However, open-mindedness towards cooperation and technological advancements. Political change by democratic rules and legislation.	In confrontation with secular modernity, atheism, liberal ethics, Westernization and global capitalism. Political change by instilling fear.
Exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism	Exclusivism: Ingroup love, ignores out-group.	Inclusivism/pluralism: Ingroup love, coexists and cooperates with outgroup.	Exclusivism: Ingroup love, outgroup hate.
Redemptive beliefs	Embraces redemptive beliefs.	Embraces redemptive beliefs.	Embraces redemptive beliefs.
Social Life	Focuses on cenobitic life and religious belief. Have visible bodily identity markers. Stays away from debates and politics and social media. Laissez faire attitude towards society.	Room for reasoning. Starts open dialogues and discussions in society. Not always visible bodily identity markers. Actively uses (social) media and technology to advocate beliefs. Starts, joins or supports political movements.	Radical disagreement, no room for reasoning. Have visible bodily identity markers. Verbal demonizing other religions and their cultures and communities in (social) media. Active use of technology to spread beliefs.
Cultural life	Withdrawn from mainstream culture.	Active participation in mainstream culture.	Withdrawn from mainstream culture.
Violence	Does not commit acts of terror in society.	Does not commit acts of terror in society.	Involved in preparing or committing acts of terror in society. Willing to sacrifice life for the cause.

Group A in table 1 is a radically conservative social group who shares common meaningful characteristics and attributes. They tend to preserve and defend their sacred values and reject being part of the worldly society, an example of this social group is the orthodox Christian *Amish* community (Crowley, 1978) in the US. However, the best course of action for religious fundamentalists who do accept the worldly society would be to pursue change by developing and using the rules of democracy in order to enhance civil rights and liberties, corresponding to group B in Table 1. This approach also debunks the dominant biased "coded" frames amplified in the media that all individuals with fundamentalist beliefs, as a rule, have a deliberate inclination toward aggression and violent behavior, or should be considered terrorists in the making. Therefore fundamentalism is not to be considered as a nuclear cohesive family of beliefs, ideas and practices disseminated by religious leaders and scholars, but as a family with a rather diffused social construction of reality [17], different sets of modern social

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[17] In sociology the social construct of reality is focused on analyzing and understanding how ordinary people in society construct the reality of their world of everyday life and the knowledge that guides them

imaginaries[18] and epistemic authority[19].

However, the news media and politicians have the inclination to frame fundamentalism as a violent phenomenon, as illustrated in group C (Table 1) and thus enhance the negative perception of fundamentalism in society. The result of the hijacked "fundamentalism frame" is that ongoingly the ingroup love and outgroup hate, as well as the "us-and-them rhetoric" is being emphasized and amplified in the media (Hamelink, 2011). It goes without saying that the minority radical group welcomes the media attention and takes the opportunity to jump on the media bandwagon to spread their hate rhetoric, whereas the more nuanced narratives of peace and justice of complaisant and democratic fundamentalistsare hardly heard in the mainstream media.

3.   Framing Theory and Examples of Fundamentalism Frames

3.1   Framing Theory

Today it is crucial to understand the framing strategies and tactics used by influential individuals and the media, as comprehending them will help us to acquire knowledge on the different modalities of religious fundamentalism. The notion of framing is anchored in the agenda setting theory, which has extended from transmitting topical public issues and political personages from the news media to a larger concept, assuming that the intense media attention for political issues will lead to more significant impact on the perception of the public. At this level agenda setting emphasizes not what the audience should think but how they should think. This occurs when the mode or frame in which media cover topical issues becomes the way the audience perceive them. However, this one-sided influence is somewhat difficult to verify as journalists get thoughts and ideas both from politicians and the people's opinions (Coleman, McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2009; Alitavoli & Kaveh, 2018; McQuail & Deuze, 2020). On a deeper level of agenda setting, framing is applied. This method, often constructed by media and communication professionals, suggests that news media content, persuasive narratives and complex understandings are constructed with specific features or a social meaning to profoundly influence the audience's reality and how they make sense of the world that surrounds them (Hallahan, 1999; Entman, 2007; Baden, 2010;McQuail & Deuze, 2020).

Finding the right definition of framing, communication scholar Christian Baden (2010) noted that frames contribute to the "construction of social meaning" and that within a frame coherent belief structures are amplified. It is used to manipulate an audience and the process anticipates influencing the information already present with the audience. Robert Entman (2007) defines framing as the process of removing aspects of perceived reality and adding new ones to a story that emphasizes associations and endorses a certain understanding. So why is it that we want others to see a reality in a certain frame? In this paragraph we will explore some frames on religious

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(Berger & Luckmann, 1991).

[18] Modern Social Imaginaries is the concept we have developed for our social existence, how we fit together with others, how things go on between us and our family and friends, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper ethical notions and images which underlie these expectations (Taylor, 2006).

[19] The construct of epistemic authority is applied to apprehend the process of knowledge formation through which people comprehend the information they have received as valid and as a result rely less on other sources (Trinkaus Zagzebski, 2012).

fundamentalism.

3.2   Fundamentalism Frames

In a simple search with the keyword 'fundamentalism' in global news media database LexisUni, the algorithm of the search engine gets us more than tens of thousands of hits. At the top of the list we find a news article on the Indian Hindutva organization Hindu Sena, as they marched to protest against the recent terrorist acts by Muslims in France and Austria. Another news story is criticizing the work of Mexican artist Helguera for combining clothing and attributes of the Virgin of Guadalupe with the head of the Virgin replaced by the skull Catrina by artist José Guadalupe Posada. According to the Catholic church, Helguera's work was meant to "ridicule what is the subject of devotion" and could trigger violence between religious groups as had recently happened in France. The British newspaper The Guardian ran a story on the documentary "People You May Know", directed by Katharina Gellein Viken and Charles Kriel, who reveal links between right wing organizations using Facebook and other digital media to influence people who attend fundamentalist Christian churches, to vote Republican. Germany's Die Welt newspaper ran an essay titled: "Europe betrays the idea of the Enlightenment; Is the danger that Islamism poses to freedom in Europe finally recognized after the attacks in France and Austria?" This brief anthology of media reports shows that around the globe fundamentalism has captured people's attention and the discourse is often about: global religion, devotion, right wing, Islamism, Hindutva, Ideology, fascism, Christian fundamentalism and so on.

As indicated earlier, however, fundamentalism is not limited to one religion; the radical American Protestant believers in the beginning of the 20th century were the first to describe themselves as "fundamentalist". The common French word to refer to 'fundamentalist' religious movements is "*intégrisme*"; this reverts to the conservative and reactionary attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in France in the beginning of the 20th century wanting to impose a Catholic way of life throughout the country and opposing secular ideologies such asliberalism and socialism (Milot, 1998)

Canadian sociologist Micheline Milot [20] points out that *intégrisme* and fundamentalism are often considered as synonyms because of the lack of a better or an alternative word for fundamentalism in the English language. "But in fact the diversity of various forms and concepts of religious activism does not justify the use of a common analysis or frame. For example, what do Israeli Jewish ultra-Orthodoxy and Islamic *intégrisme* have in common? Or American capitalist imperialism, Krishna-Consciousness, Jehovah's Witnesses and Balkan Orthodoxy of Kosovo? Intégrisme, or fundamentalism, just like modernism, is a controversial concept, composed by its adversaries. As French Catholic priest and sociologist of religion Émile Poulat puts it, in fact, it is a kind of a nickname or frame" (Milot, 1998). This selective way of

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[20] Original French passage: …"L'intégrisme recouvre des réalités fort diverses, au point qu'il est parfois difficile de justifier le recours à une même catégorie d'analyse. Qu'ont en commun l'ultra-orthodoxie juive israélienne, l'intégrisme islamique, l'impérialisme capitaliste américain, la Conscience de Krishna, les Témoins de Jéhovah, l'orthodoxie balkanique du Kosovo? L'intégrisme — comme le modernisme — est un concept polémique, forgé par ses adversaires. Il est donc en quelque sorte un sobriquet, comme le notait Emile Poulat. Il a fallu d'abord le dégager de cette étiquette infamante, afin de le rendre acceptable comme catégorie sociologique permettant de discerner les rapports de force qui interviennent dans les sociétés qui le produisent ou le reproduisent."

demarking and framing minorities is articulated by author and evangelist Brian Stiller, who noted that in Canada fundamentalism was a "code word" or moniker used by the Canadian media elite to frame believers who, according to the elite, had "no place in the public mainstream of our culture" (Stiller, cited in Haskell[21], 2009).

With regard to framing religious minorities as fundamentalist in the media, this "coding" with a particular negative connotation about the group leads to the public being provided with a negative frame that activates and enhances particular stereotypes about religious minorities. Milot stresses that today's burgeoning fundamentalist movements phenomena cannot be simply explained as a group of religious fanatics who refuse modernity, and that on the contrary it should be considered as a tangible and at the same time enigmatic religious product of modernity, or to use Charles Taylor's (2007) term; a product of themalaise of modernity[22].

France has the largest population (5-6 million) of Muslims in Europe and provides a clear example how religion and secularism clash on some vital point. In the autumn of 2020 France was brutally reminded that terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists are not a ghost from the recent past. Two people were stabbed near the former headquarters of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, high school teacher Samuel Patty was beheaded, and an attack was carried out at the Notre Dame church in Nice, killing 3 churchgoers. These tactics to attract maximum global media attention in order to amplify and enhance the spread of fear, on top of the lingering Covid-19 anxieties, reveals Al-Qaeda[23] and ISIS style terrorism campaigns of the recent past in Europe aimed at gaining militant Islamist support, by demonstrating that they are still on an equal footing with Western powers and to engage them in counter attacks (Juergensmeyer, 2017).

In the aftermath of the beforementioned terrorist attacks French Interior Affairs Minister Gerald Darmanin came with a predictable statement [24] using the "*Islamofascism*" frame by describing Islam as a malicious ideology and that France is at war with an enemy,both at home and abroad:

> *"We are not at war against a religion but against an ideology, the Islamist ideology, which represents a form of 21st century fascism with the objective to impose her cultural codes, her way of life and her way of managing emotions through terror"*, hestated.

In France "l'Islamo-gauchisme[25]", or "Islamo-leftism" is a common frame and representation in the media of French citizens with a migratory and Muslim

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[21] Haskell. D. (2009) Use of the term "Fundamentalist Christian" in Canadian national television news. In Hoover, M. S. & Kaneva, N. eds., *Fundamentalists and the Media.*

[22] According to Taylor the malaise of modernity is part of the process of secularization in the Western world. "The connection between pursuing a moral or spiritual path and belonging to larger ensembles – state, church, even denomination – has been further loosened; and as a result the nova effect has been intensified. We are now living in a spiritual super-nova, a kind of galloping pluralism on the spiritual plane." Taylor, C. (2007) A secular Age. The Nova Effect. The malaise of modernity, pp-299-321.

[23] The militant Islamist multi-national organization, which is held responsible for 9/11 and the last two decenniacoordinated terror attacks around the globe.

[24] Lepelletier, P. (30 October, 2020) Le figaro. Retrieved 14-11-2020 from: https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/terrorisme-nous-sommes-en-guerre-contre-l-ideologie-islamiste-affirme- gerald-darmanin-20201030

[25] Its exact origin is difficult to trace, nonetheless it can be related with the leftwing English Marxist Trotskyist and as a neologism to emphasis that Muslims are new proletariat associated with Islam fundamentalism (Torrekens, 2020, 46-50).

background. For example, political Islamism in French media, but also in some other Western countries, is often framed as an "epidemic", threatening the public wellbeing. In an empirical study "Constructing Muslims in France" on how the public identities of French Muslims are constructed in France, Jennifer Fredette (2014) argues that the common media frames for Muslims in the media are that of being violent and intolerant and that the constructed frames are also applied by media in the US using terminology such as "Intifada", "jihad" and immigrant rioters from Arab and African countries. In a content analysis of Muslims in France and Turkey, Connor Nickerson's (2019) findings also suggest that U.S news media apply negative frames for Muslims associated with terrorism. Abderrahim Ait Abdeslam (2019) concludes in a media discourse analysis that in general, Islam is negatively represented in the French quality newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro. The other common negative frames in these newspapers are that of Islam as right-wing political Islamism, homophobe religion, Islam as a threat to France's constitutional secularism: Laïcité[26], rights of women and rights of LGBTQ community.

The negative frames in French digital media backfired in society, paving the way for religious fundamentalists to recruit actively for the Jihad and reiterating the negative connotation. Akil Awan, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin (2019) conclude that ISIS campaigners used the French frames in digital media to persuade Muslims to join ISIS: Firstly, the alienation and estrangement rhetoric, stressing the Islamophobia (in France), campaigners want to capitalize on intolerance against Muslims and immigrants; secondly, the ongoing *laïcité* and that France is no longer the country of *Liberté*[27] and *égalité*[28]. For example the campaigners used the highly publicized event in 2016 which shows the humiliation of the Muslim women wearing burkinis who were forced to undress by French police. This caused outrage on social media[29] resulting in the hashtag #WTFFrance[30] and was globally rewarded and supported with comments, retweets and likes. The strategy behind this narrative is to appeal to all Muslims and immigrants that despite significant efforts to contribute to the society, they will always be considered outsiders and aliens and that in the "utopian caliphate they can be blissful citizens". Also, the campaigners used the socio-economic marginalization narrative, which emphasizes the deprived and poor living standard immigrants and Muslims are subjected to in the French and Belgium banlieues[31] engulfed in crime[32], drugs and unemployment.

In the Netherlands, Leen d'Haenens and Susan Bink (2007) conclude in a research into the framing of Muslims in Dutch press, with focus on the popular newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad* ,that the international Islam is framed as a fundamentalist religion, associated with terrorism and violence, and to a lesser extent the Imbedded Dutch Muslim community. However, Wasif Shadid (2009) explicitly argues in the article

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[26] France's constitutional policy of strict secularism in the public sphere.

[27] Freedom.

[28] Equality.

[29] Morin, V. (2016) Le Monde. Indignation devant les photos d'une femme voilée contrôlée sur la plage à Nice. Retreived 12.12.2020 from: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/08/24/les-photos-d-une-femme- contrainte-d-enlever-son-voile-a-nice-suscitent-emoi-et-incomprehension_4987497_3224.html

[30] What the fuck France?

[31] Suburbs.

[32] "70% of the prison population is Muslim, despite the fact that Muslims only make up around 7%-8% of the general population in France" (Atran & Hamid, 2015 in Awin et al., 2019).

"Muslim in the Media" that the "ethnocentrism" frame is commonly used to depict Muslims. This frame is based on Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory that media users are familiarized with a "us-them" contrast and with "our" versus "their" culture, where the former is valued better or higher, respectively. The second frame Shadid mentions is the "stigmatizing frame", the main characteristic of this frame being that immigrants and Muslims are presented as problem groups: they are associated more than strictly necessary with crime, social abuse, terrorism, unemployment and drugs.

David Herbert's findings (2013) on Islamophobia and Xenophobia with regard to the anti- immigration rhetoric of Geert Wilders, leader of Dutch populist right-wing party Partij voor de Vrijheid[33] (PVV), suggest that not only the mainstream media, but increasingly the social media network offers an excellent platform for the dissemination of Islamophobic or Xenophobic frames. However, he added that at the same time, both the right-wing extremists, minority groups and social activists are participating on the platforms to protest and show oppositional views. Most of the time the social media networks offer a communal space for debate and are used to support controversial individuals or beliefs in both the digital and physical world (Herbert, 2013). In a more recent study into the framing of Muslims in Dutch media, Antske Fokkens et al. (2017) concluded that reporting with regard to Muslims was mainly negative and associated with Muslim fundamentalism such as terrorist attacks.

Just like Muslim fundamentalism, the right-wing Hindu organization Bharatiya Janata Party[34] (RSS) in India has its roots in the colonial British India and was established by a militant group of Hindus who were angered by centuries of both Muslim (Mughal) and Christian (British) colonialism on the Indian subcontinent and ongoing forced conversion of Hindus (Van der Veer, 1994; Clarke, 2017). According to German scholar Tobias Delfs, the vital youthfulness and strong masculinity of young adults is essential for the embodiment of RSS's Hindutva philosophy, which is based on the idea of a "principal nation" and an "alien nation" developed by Swiss politician and scholar Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-81). This ideology has been exerted by the Hindutva movement as it specified the "Hindus as principal nation" and Muslims as the "alien nation" in the Indian context (Delfs, 2008). The Hindutva dogma can be illustrated by the following quote[35]: "We Hindus came into this land (India) from nowhere, but are indigenous children of the soil always, from time immemorial and are natural masters of the country (…) And we were one nation – Over all the land from sea to sea one Nation!".

Anti-Muslim frames, conspiracy theories and fake news items are ongoingly circulating in Indian digital media to create panic and societal anxiety. In the media Muslims are often framed as fundamentalists, terrorists and intolerant (Narayana & Kapur, 2011). A study of Indian television news in English shows that common frames to marginalize Muslims are associations of Islam as a religion "with 'primitive' practices that are unjust to women, primitive, archaic, violent and anti-national" (Drabu, 2018). In an ongoing ethnographic fieldwork that started in 2013 in the cities of Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore, targeting politically active social media users, researchers noted that the RSS actively uses digital media to frame their message

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[33] The Freedom Party.

[34] RSS was established in 1925 by physician K.B. Hedgewar.

[35] C. Bhatt & P. Mukta (2000) "Hindutva in the West: Mapping the Antinomies of Diaspora Nationalism"; in Ethnic and Racial Studies; vol. 23, no 3. pp. 417.

(Udupa, 2019). Some of the campaign strategists are Hindu nationalist youth leaders, a digitally savvy well-educated generation, who have embraced social media networking sites as an essential outlet for Hindutva propaganda. Indian scholar Sahana Udupa suggests that fun[36], humor and popular culture have been vital for right-wing organizations to mobilize people. Frames used against minorities in the Hindutva propaganda are the following: Muslim community as main threats to Hindu nation; Global conspiracy of Christian proselytization and ridiculing left-liberal intelligentsia as "pseudo-seculars" to "urban- Naxalites[37]" (Udupa, 2019).

While the clashes between Hindus and Muslims are highly publicized, the collision of Hindu nationalists with Christian fundamentalists receive scant media attention, despite violent interfaith confrontations, hinduphobia, hate speech on Christian television channels marginalizing Hindu's and implicit messages on Christian websites framing Hinduism is a lesser religion fueled with superstition (Thomas, 2009). The website content of the Indian fundamentalist evangelical Christian organizations often reiterates the narratives of fundamentalist churches in the US. A common narrative to demonize Hinduism is that of the holy Hindu city of Varanasi as the capital of Hindu God Shiva, who is framed as the embodiment of Satan (Thomas, 2008, 2009).

In sum, a fundamentalism frame is a societal phenomenon and increasingly found in all digital mass media. However, the various frames have value beyond the news sphere as they convey strong persuasive generalizations about religious extremists and also construct toxic realities about mainstream religion which guide people's perception in everyday life around the globe.

6.   Discussion and Conclusion

The literature review showed how complex and interdisciplinary the study of the vying religious fundamentalisms and digital media is. The main question of the article is to research how digital mass media are facilitating the framing of religious groups we call fundamentalist. The exact impact of social media networks in altering or enhancing fundamentalist beliefs and social imaginaries is inconclusive. Societal impact is harder to predict and to quantify than the media impact value of a product or brand. As the significance of global fundamentalism is burgeoning and ongoingly shifting societies and people's lives around the globe, it would be interesting to develop tangible religion and media theories that address societal impact.

The globally increased consumption of news through social media networks makes it possible for the process of framing to go viral and accelerate at an exponential rate, giving mass media an instant and controlling result on the public's perception. However, today's sphere of influence is different than that of the 1940s, or of Habermas' bourgeois eighteenth-century public sphere. Religious fundamentalists, right-wing extremists, pressure groups and elected governments and dictatorial

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[36] Being "funny" is a tactical way to enter online debates and in the public domain in general; Fun gives freshness in political debates as a contrast to the serious tone of voice by mainstreaming political campaigners; Fun gives tangible satisfaction with trending hashtag and viral going messages/tweets/posts; Fun helps groupthink and identification, as well as the (anonymous) celebration of aggression (Udupa, 2019).

[37] Naxal or Naxalite is a common frame in India to refer to the Communist (Marxist-Leninist) militia in India.

regimes, all deploy the same open access battle ground weaponized with digital technologies such as social media networks, propaganda sites and blogs for monitoring, collecting, analyzing and storing data, as well as for influencing the public with their plans. It has also become axiomatic that social media networks carry conspiracy theories and disseminate misinformation. Who will have access to these networks, and why others will not, will in future be determined by the mainstream media conglomerates.

In many Western countries, the ongoing terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists triggered serious societal anxiety and social panic. It is therefore not a surprise that both in mainstream popular media and the social media, fundamentalism is often used as a nickname, frame or moniker to refer to religious fundamentalists. In the Western world, the meaning of Islam as a faith is to some extent re-functionalized, representing different semantics, such as Islamism, Muslim terrorism, political fundamentalism. As illustrated in Table 1, there is little room for nuance; believers who follow the creed and fundamentals of their faiths, for example the complaisant group and fundamentalists who pursue change through democratic means, are still framed as radical fundamentalists. The ongoing framing of a religion as fundamentalist with misinformation, hate speech, fun, humor and fake news is legal and licit in most democratic countries, but still harmful for believers. The belittling and humiliation of minority religions in digital media in any society can be considered a form of digital terror. While there are various motivations for digital discrimination and violence, often they have the objective to humiliate or in some cases eliminate the out-group (Hamelink, 2011), which is a strategy often applied by the dominant groups to maintain themselves (De Swaan, 1988)[38].

With some exception, the academic focus on fundamentalism is centered around the Abrahamic religion in the Western world particularly, with an emphasis on Muslim fundamentalism. On Hinduism, the emphasis is often on the clash between Muslims and Hindus; this is a one-side view of the topic, and more up-to-date empiric research is necessary to analyze for instance the collision of fundamentalist secularists with various faiths in India.

Also, Hinduism is also known as a syncretic religion and therefore fundamentalism as phenomenon seem somewhat incommensurate with the historic development of the religion.
More interdisciplinary qualitative research is necessary to define the fundamentalism phenomenon and to review fundamentalist narratives, conspiracy theories, misinformation and other content in digital media, in order to understand how this influences our social imaginaries and epistemic authority in multiple cultures and religions.

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Appendix

Authors	Elements of Religious Fundamentalism
Giddens (1991)	Provides clear-cut answers as to what to do in an era which has abandoned final authorities, resolves challenges how to live in a world with multiple options and addresses issues of the moral meaning of existence which modern institutions tend to dissolve.
Altemeyer & Hunsberger (1992)	Array of religious dogmas that include various sets of beliefs on God, deities and truth and as a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism.
Marty & Appleby (1993, 2002)	Movements (Christian, Islam, Jewish and Hindu) share "family resemblances", but not all believers are fundamentalists, or terrorists.
Salzman (2003, 2008)	Human need for meaning: Anxiety driven response to find meaning, belonging and self-value in a dangerous religion that offers humans value and an anxiety-buffer against the terror of human existence.
Ruthven (2007)	Contemporary dynamic movements, reactionary, male authority, modern phenomena offering solution for alienation and contemporary dilemmas.
Taylor (2007)	Part of modern social imaginaries. Fanatism and enthusiasm; only accountable to God, not to a civil or ecclesiastical authority.

Thomas (2008)	Collective and Individual identity based on the certainty of core values sourced from religious texts applicable for eternity and bolstering the shifting values of the 21st century.
Clarke (2016)	Communal mindset anchored in a worldview with an ethical system for its followers and managed by a violent, aggressive, movement that works towards social, political, economic and cultural dominance.
Juergensmeyer (2017)	Communities with cultures (ideas and grouping) of violence.
Berger (2018)	Focus on extremism and based on Tajfel & Turner's (1986) Social Identity Theory: Extremism refers to the belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group.
Peels (2020)	Family resemblance, reactionary towards modern developments, it is itself modern, and based on a grand historical narrative.

Author Note